Introduction
Consider a polytope P in dimension d with 2d facets which is simple, that is, each vertex belongs to exactly d facets of P . Two vertices x and y of P form a complementary pair (x y) if every facet of P is incident with x or y. The Here, we do not consider this problem but the following variation. Consider two simple d-polytopes P and Q, each with 2d facets labeled 1 : : : 2d. A vertex
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of a polytope has the labels of the facets it lies on. A vertex pair (x y) of (P Q) (which is a vertex of the product polytopeP Q) is called complementary if every label 1 : : : 2d appears as a label of x or y. If P and Q are identical and identically labeled, then this is the above single-polytope problem. If P and Q are equal to the d-cube and identically labeled, then (P Q) has 2 d ordered pairs of vertices that are complementary.
However, this is not the maximal number. We will show that if P and Q are equal to the polar of the d-dimensional cyclic polytope and the labels of Q are permuted relative to the labels of P in a certain way, t h e n ( P Q The problem of complementary pairs for two polytopes originates from game theory in the following form: What is the maximal numberof Nash equilibria of a nondegenerate d d bimatrix game? A bimatrix game is a game for two players given by two (not necessarily square) matrices of equal dimension. The matrix entries represent the players' payo s if player 1 chooses a row and player 2 a column as his strategy. A (Nash) equilibrium 19] is a pair of randomized strategies, one for each player, that are payo -maximizing against each other. For each p l a yer, the upper envelope of his expected payo s for his own strategies (against the randomized strategy of his opponent) de nes a polyhedron 27, 8, 10] . After a suitable projective transformation, this is a polytope, which is simple if the game is nondegenerate. For the resulting two polytopes, a complementary vertex pair corresponds to an equilibrium of the game.
In this context, the d-cubes arise if each player's payo matrix is the identity matrix. Quint and Shubik 20] conjectured that these are the d d games with a maximal number of equilibria. We refute this conjecture for d 6 using the polytope approach. The Quint{Shubik conjecture follows for d 3 from the Upper Bound Theorem. For d = 4 it has been shown in 7, 14] . The case d = 5 is open. The single-polytope problem has no game-theoretic interpretation, not even for symmetric games, since the construction of the two polytopes (see Proposition 2.1 below) di ers for the two players.
The Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept for noncooperative games 24]. Algorithms for enumerating equilibria are useful when analyzing such games. The fastest known algorithms 27, 8, 10] use vertex enumeration for polytopes, and apply even to degenerate games 29, 6 ]. In the games we construct here, a large numberof vertices de ne equilibria, which shows that these algorithms cannot be substantially improved. Other algorithms for nding equilibria are surveyed in 11, 26] . Bounds and distributions for certain kinds of equilibria are considered in 23, 12, 13] .
The correspondence between polytope pairs and equilibria of bimatrix games is explained in Section 2 (for further exposition see 25, 26] ). The construction based on cyclic polytopes is shown in Section 3. An asymptotic expression for the number of complementary vertex pairs in this class of examples is derived in Section 4.
Game equilibria and polytopes
We u s e the following notation. The transpose of a m a t r i x B is B > . All vectors are column vectors. The zero vector is 0, the vector of all ones is 1, their dimension depending on the context. Inequalities like x 0 between two vectors hold for all components. The n n identity matrix is I n .
Let (A B) be a bimatrix game, where A and B are m n matrices of payo s to player 1 and player 2, respectively. The rows are the pure strategies of player 1 and the columns are the pure strategies of player 2. A mixed strategy x for player 1 ( o r y for player 2) is a probability distribution on rows (respectively, columns), written as a vector of probabilities. An equilibrium of the game is a pair (x y) of mixed strategies so that x > Ay x > Ay and x > By x > Byfor all other mixed strategies x and y, respectively.
In equilibrium, player 1 (and similarly player 2) maximizes his expected payo x > Ay against y. Equivalently 19] , only those rows i that have maximum payo u can have positive probability x i . This combinatorial condition can be expressed using the following polyhedra. Let P = f(x v) 2 IR m IR j x 0 B > x 1v 1 > x = 1 g Q = f(y u) 2 IR n IR j Ay 1u y 0 1 > y = 1 g:
In Q, for example, the smallest value for u given y de nes the upper envelope of the expected payo s for all pure strategies of player 1, given by the rows of Ay. In equilibrium, only optimal pure strategies i may have positive probability, so that either the ith inequality i n Ay 1u in the de nition of Q is binding (i is optimal), or the ith inequality in x 0 in the de nition of P is binding (x i = 0),or both.
Similarly, a pure strategy j of player 2 is optimal or not played, represented by the jth inequality in B > x 1v or in y 0 in the de nition of P or Q that holds as an equality.
For identifying equilibria, it is therefore useful to consider the pure strategies of the two players as labels 1 : : : m + n numbering the m + n inequalities in the de nitions of P and Q in (2.1). The rst m of these labels represent the pure strategies of player 1, the second n those of player 2. Then an equilibrium is a pair (x y) so that (x v) 2 P and (y u) 2 Q for suitable payo s v and u, and for each label 1 : : : m + n the corresponding inequality i n P or in Q is binding.
The polyhedra in (2.1) can be simpli ed by normalizing the payo s to one and replacing probabilities by arbitrary nonnegative numbers. Let P = fx 2 IR m j x 0 B > x 1 g Q = fy 2 IR n j Ay 1 y 0 g: This assumption can be made without loss of generality since a constant can be added to all payo s without changing the game in a material way. We could simply assume that A and B are positive b u t w ant to admit examples like A = B = I n (if m = n) where some payo s are zero. By (2.4), P and Q are polytopes (bounded polyhedra). The projective transformations (2.3) are one-to-one correspondences between P and P ; f 0g and Q and Q ; f 0g, respectively, that preserve binding inequalities (for visualizations see 25, 26] ). The extra vertex 0 of P and Q arises as projection \from in nity".
A label of a point in P or Q is a number in 1 : : : m + n so that the corresponding inequality in (2.2) is binding. A pair (x y) of points in P Q is called complementary if every label 1 : : : m + n appears as a label of x or of y. With the exception of (0 0), complementary pairs de ne the equilibria of the bimatrix game (A B) by renormalizing x and y to be vectors of probabilities.
Any complementary pair is the convex combination of extreme complementary pairs (x y) where x is a vertex of P and y is a vertex of Q 10, 29, 6, 26] . We consider only nondegenerate (or \generic") games where only pairs of vertices can be complementary. Otherwise, the game may h a ve in nitely many equilibria (as convex combinations of extreme equilibria). Furthermore, even the number of extreme equilibria may trivially be very large, for example if all entries of B are identical (so all vertices of P except 0 have all but one label) and Q is a polytope with a maximum numberof vertices.
A game is called nondegenerate if against every mixed strategy z of a player, there are at most jfi j z i > 0gj pure strategies of the opponent that are optimal.
This means that every point in P has at most m labels and every point in Q has at most n labels. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the following 26]: A binding inequality for P or Q de nes either a facet of that polytope or the empty set, but no other lower-dimensional face and P and Q are simple polytopes. Inequalities that are never binding represent strictly dominated strategies 24] which are never played in equilibrium, so they can beomitted from the game. Hence, we assume that P and Q in (2.2) are simple polytopes with facets labeled 1 : : : m +n. For complementary vertex pairs (x y),only the combinatorial structure of these polytopes matters. The special structure of the rst m inequalities x 0 of P and of the second n inequalities y 0 of Q is not a restriction, since this can be achieved by a suitable a ne transformation for each polytope, as follows.
Proposition 2.1. Let P 0 be a simple m-polytope and Q 0 be a simple n-polytope, both with m + n labeled facets, which have at least one complementary pair (x 0 y 0 ) of vertices. Then there are m n matrices A and B de ning P and Q in (2.2), a permutation of the labels 1 : : : m + n of P 0 and Q 0 yielding the labels of P and Q, and invertible a ne transformations from P 0 to P and from Q 0 to Q that map (x 0 y 0 ) to (0 0). Furthermore, every complementary vertex pair of (P 0 Q 0 ) except (x 0 y 0 ) represents a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A B).
Proof. Permute the labels 1 : : : m + n in the same way f o r P 0 and Q 0 such t h a t x 0 has labels 1 : : : m and y 0 has labels m + 1 : : : m + n. This does not change the complementary pairs of (P 0 Q 0 ).Let P 0 = fz 2 IR m j C z p Dz q g where C z p represents the m inequalities for the facets 1 : : : m and Dz q the remaining n inequalities. For the vertex x 0 , we have C x 0 = p and Dx 0 < q since P 0 is simple. The m binding inequalities for x 0 are linearly independent since x 0 is a vertex, so C is invertible and z 7 ! x = ;C z+ p is an a ne transformation with inverse z = ;C ;1 (x ; p). Let P = fx 2 IR m j ;C ;1 (x ; p) 2 P 0 g. Then, with r = q ; DC ;1 p, P = fx 2 IR m j ; x 0 ;DC ;1 x r g: Corresponding points of P and P 0 have the same labels. Since the vertex 0 of P corresponds to x 0 in P 0 , 0 < r. Thus, the jth row of ;DC ;1 x r can be normalized by multiplication with the scalar 1=r j , so we can assume r = 1. Then P is de ned as in (2.2) with the n m transposed payo matrix B > = ;DC ;1 .
Similarly, w e can nd an m n matrix A so that Q in (2.2) is an a ne transform of Q 0 . The complementary vertex pairs of (P 0 Q 0 ) except (x 0 y 0 ) correspond to the Nash equilibria of (A B) b y construction. If desired, a constant can be to the entries of A and B to obtain (2.4), which does not change the combinatorial structure of P and Q.
Polytopes P 0 and Q 0 with general labeling may h a ve n o c o m p l e m e n tary pairs at all, so this case is explicitly excluded in Proposition 2.1. Interestingly, the numberof complementary pairs of (P Q) in Proposition 2.1 is always even, since the algorithm by Lemke and Howson 9, 21, 28] connects complementary pairs in P Q by paths where a given label is missing. It computes one Nash equilibrium of the game when started from (0 0).
Cyclic polytopes and a lower bound
We specialize the problem of nding nondegenerate m n games with a large number of equilibria to square games where m = n = d. Then For m = n, ( n 2n) grows asymptotically from n to n+ 1 b y a n a verage factor of p 27=4 = 2 :598:::, m uch faster than 2 n . We consider more precise asymptotics in Section 4.
In our construction, we let P = Q = C d (2d) , which are simple polytopes since C d (2d) is simplicial. We consider only even dimensions d. In odddimension, the polytopes P 0 and Q 0 in (3.1) constructed from P and Q in the next lower even dimension d have a larger numberof complementary vertex pairs than those based on the cyclic polytopes in dimension d + 1 .
So, in the following, observe that d = 2l is even, there are N = 2d = 4l points on the moment curve, whose convex hull de nes C d (N), and which after translation so that 0 is in the interior of that polytope represent the normal vectors of the facets of its polar C d (N) as in (3.2), which have to be suitably labeled. Furthermore, the facets of C d (N) de ne the vertices of P and Q, among which we look for complementary pairs.
It su ces to look at the representation of these vertices of P and Q, the facets of C d (N),by 0-1-strings s = s 1 s 2 : : : s N , for example s = 01101100 if d = 4 , N = 8 .
These Proof. Clearly, any string s as described ful lls the Gale evenness condition. The substrings 00, 11, and 0110 in s are complemented to 11, 00, and 1001, respectively, and permuted by to substrings 11, 00, and 0110, respectively, i n s . Similarly, a n initial or terminal substring 10 or 01 is left as it is, so s also ful lls Gale evenness. Conversely, suppose s is not of the described form. If s starts with the substring 10, remove it. Then, remove repeatedly all initial substrings 00, 11, or 0110 from s.
If the remainder starts with 10, 0100, or 0101, the Gale evenness condition fails for s. If it starts with 0111 (the only possibility left), it becomes 0100 in s so the condition fails there.
Let E(d) bethe numberof complementary vertex pairs of (P Q) in our construction, where P = Q = C d (2d) and the labels of Q are permuted by . By If a string in S(l) contains k substrings 00, 0 k l, then it contains the same number of substrings 11 since it is balanced, and l ; k substrings 0110. These substrings may be arranged in any manner, with (l + k)!=(k! k! ( l ;k)!) many possibilities. Hence,
The rst values of (l) are given as follows. The numbers~ (l) are an asymptotic approximation that we will prove in the next section. Our construction produces the rst counterexample to the Quint{Shubik conjecture for d = 6 since E(6) = 76 > 2 6 (already E(4) = 16 = 2 4 , where the equilibria are quite di erent from the game where A = B = I 4 ). A speci c 6 6 bimatrix game with 75 Nash equilibria using the points (t) and (;t) for t = 1 2 : : : 6 on the moment curve, a translation so that the barycenter of these points is 0 (for polarity), and Proposition 2.1, is described in 25].
Does the permutation (3.4) yield the maximum number of complementary pairs for the cyclic polytopes? Trying out all (2d)! permutations shows that it does for d = 6, where the permutation is unique up to the symmetry (cyclic shift and reversal) of the strings ful lling the Gale evenness condition. This computation takes hours for d = 6 and therefore was not attempted for d = 8. We sketch a proof that (3.4) is optimal for d = 6. Any Gale evenness string not in S(3) has a substring 011110 or 01111110 starting on an even position. For example, it may be 011110s with s = 001100. Consider the strings 011011s and 001111s which belongto S (3) and which both di er from 011110s in only one label. Hence, these are vertices of P forming a triangle or \clique " 14] . The complementary sets of labels for these vertices share d ; 1 labels. The corresponding d ; 1 facets of Q meet in an edge (if at all) that contains only two vertices of Q. Hence, a face of P that is a triangle can have at most two v ertices that are part of complementary pairs, and the two i n S(3) already are, so 011110s is not unless another complementary pair is sacri ced. Similarly, replacing a substring 01111110 by its neighbors 01111011, 01101111, and 00111111 de nes a simplex as a face of P with again only two vertices that can be part of complementary pairs. So the 00-11-0110 strings yield indeed the maximum number of complementary pairs for d = 6. It may be interesting to extend this argument to higher dimensions.
The electronic server, described there) reveal. The number (n) is the number of \King paths on a chessboard " 16] , that is, the number of paths in a two-dimensional integer lattice from (0 0) to (n n) where the allowed steps are one unit right, up, or diagonal (each s u c h step corresponding to a substring 00, 11, or 0110, respectively). According to 1, p. 81], (n) = P n (3) for the nth Legendre polynomial P n de ned explicitly by P n (x) = 17] or recursively by P 0 (x) = 1 , P 1 (x) = x and P n (x) = x (2 ; 1=n) P n;1 (x) ; (1 ; 1=n) P n;2 (x) : (4: 3)
The recurrence (4.3) can be veri ed by (4.2) . For x = 3, (n) = P n (3), it can | with some e ort | also begiven a combinatorial interpretation in terms of the lattice paths with diagonal steps. Using the generating function Regarded as a function on the complex plane C, the function g is analytic around the origin with Taylor coe cients (n) as in (4.4) . We use a theorem of 2] that shows how to obtain information about these coe cients from the behavior of g at its dominant singularity (the one with smallest absolute value). For simplicity, we state this theorem with overly strong assumptions concerning the domain of the function which we de ne here as = C ; f z 2 IR j z 1 g : 
